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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 Introduction 
In terms of section 80 of the Urban Councils Act of Zimbabwe, [Chapter 29:15], the 
Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development may appoint a caretaker to 
act as council in certain circumstances. While this power has been used to correct 
problems in some local authorities, it has not always been used for the purpose it was 
created. The amendments to the Act, brought about by the Local Government Laws 
Amendment Act 1 of 2008 were meant to address some of the shortcomings in the 
application of section 80. This study looks at the new provision with a view to 
establishing the correct basis for the appointment of a caretaker. 
1.1 Background to the study 
Local authorities in Zimbabwe are creatures of statute. Accordingly they can only do that 
which the enabling legislation says they can do. In other words they exercise what is 
commonly referred to as delegated authority. In Zimbabwe the primary local government 
legislation are the Urban Councils Act (UCA) [Chapter 29:15]1, the Rural District 
Councils Act (RDCA) [Chapter 29:13], The Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) [Chapter 
29:17] and the Provincial Councils and Administration Act (PCAA) [Chapter 
29:11].Section 2 of each of the above pieces of legislation places the administration of 
the Acts in the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. 
 It is the Minister who is charged with the monitoring and supervision of local 
government. This supervision may be divided into three broad forms i.e. regulation, 
monitoring or evaluation and intervention. Regulation relates to the establishment of the 
institutional framework for the operation of local government as well as its functions.  
Monitoring relates to the establishment of mechanisms aimed at continuously looking at 
the general performance of local government to see whether there is compliance with the 
                                                            
1 Legislation in Zimbabwe, except for subsidiary legislation such as statutory instruments and regulations 
is identified by way of chapters and classified in accordance with the subject matter. In this regard, the 
UCA is volume 15 of Chapter 29.   
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law. It is an ongoing exercise done by the central government and will invariably 
“include the functional mechanisms to evaluate local government performance coupled 
with mechanisms for intervening into local governments if the evaluations produce 
evidence of serious problems”.2 It is similar to supervision where national government 
watches over local government in order to ensure appropriate behaviour. In its complex 
form, supervision may take the form of an intervention in the affairs of local government 
in order to correct an identified problem. 
The monitoring and supervision of local government is usually done by central 
governments. However in some countries like South Africa where there three spheres of 
government the provincial executive is charged with the supervision of the local sphere 
of government.3 In Zimbabwe the monitoring and supervision of local government is 
done by the central government through the relevant Minister. This study will look at the 
appointment of a caretaker to act as council in terms of section 80 of the UCA. Although 
a similar provision exists in section 158 of the RDCA, it is section 80 that has been 
vigorously applied by the Minister in recent times and which has caused an outcry from 
urban local authorities. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Section 16 of the Local Government Laws Amendment Act4 introduced the new section 
80 of the UCA. It provides for the appointment of a caretaker to act as council if: 
a) there are no councillors for a council area; or 
b) all the elected councillors for a council area have been suspended or imprisoned 
or are otherwise unable to exercise all or some of their functions as councillors. 
                                                            
2 De Visser (2005, 178). 
3 Section 139 of the South African Constitution. Further section 155 (6) requires the provincial 
government to put in place legislative or other measures to provide for the monitoring and support of 
local government. Section 155 (7) requires both the provincial and national governments to exercise their 
legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions. 
4 No. 1 of 2008. 
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The amendment followed the suspension and dismissals of councillors, particularly in 
urban areas and their replacement with commissioners in terms of the then section 80 of 
the UCA. In all the instances that the section was invoked, commissioners were 
appointed and reappointed for long periods thus raising the question whether the 
appointments were in fact meant to replace elected councillors with appointed 
commissioners. While section 80 is meant to provide a stop-gap measure by replacing 
councillors with a caretaker in certain circumstances while preparing for the election of a 
new council, the challenge is to ensure that the section is invoked for the reasons for 
which it was enacted.  
In terms of the old section 80, a commissioner appointed to act as council would serve 
until a new council was elected, or for six (6) months, whichever occurred sooner, 
provided that if the six months expired within three (3) months of the date of the next 
succeeding general election, the commissioner would continue to hold office until such 
general election. In addition if the Minister was satisfied at the termination of the office 
of the commissioner that there would be no councillors for the council area who would be 
able to exercise all their functions, he could reappoint the commissioner for six months or 
until there was a new council. 
1.3 Focus and objective of the study 
This study seeks to address two issues. Firstly it seeks to critically examine the laws on 
the appointment of a caretaker to act as council in terms of section 80. In carrying out this 
critical examination, the questions to ask are: What does the appointment of a caretaker 
mean? Under what circumstances can the Minister exercise this power? What does it 
mean when the caretaker exercises all the functions of the council or such of the 
functions of the elected councillors as they are unable to exercise? What safeguards are in 
place to ensure that the appointment of the caretaker will be for bonafide purposes 
outlined in the Act? Lastly, is the new section 80 an improvement on the old section 80?  
1.4 Literature Review 
There is a paucity of local government law research in Zimbabwe. Consequently this 
study seeks to chart the way for a critical examination of local government laws in 
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Zimbabwe by looking at the laws that provide for the appointment of a caretaker as well 
as judgments from the courts on the appointment of a caretaker in terms of section 80 of 
the UCA.  
1.5 Methodology  
The research is mainly based on a desk review of relevant legislation, case law, and 
ministerial directives pertaining to the invocation of section 80 of the UCA. Additionally 
a comparative study will be made of the Zimbabwean system of the appointment of a 
caretaker with a similar form of intervention in another jurisdiction with a view to 
proposing changes to the law.  
1.6 Structure of the Study 
Chapter 1 will give a general background to the study as well as its outline. Chapter 2 is a 
brief outline of the history of local government in Zimbabwe from 1890 up to the 
present- its legal status, sources of revenue and challenges faced by local government. It 
will conclude by looking into the future and the role that local government can play in the 
development of local communities and democracy. 
 Chapter 3 explores the substantive and procedural requirements for the appointment of a 
caretaker. To put it differently, what circumstances existing in an urban local authority 
will trigger the appointment of a caretaker in terms of section 80? How is the caretaker 
appointed?  Chapter 4 examines the functions of the caretaker after a section 80 
appointment. Chapter 5 carries a case study of the appointment of commissioners for the 
City of Harare under the old section 80 of the UCA. Chapter 6 will carry a comparative 
analysis of the Zimbabwean and South African legal systems on the dissolution of a 
municipal council and the appointment of a caretaker and or administrator. Lastly 
Chapter 7 will be on recommended changes to the law. 
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   CHAPTER 2 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter 1 looked at the background to the study, statement of the problem, the focus and 
objective of the study as well as literature review. It also looked at the methodology to be 
followed in the study and concluded by giving an outline or structure of the study. This 
Chapter will give a general outline of the development of local government in Zimbabwe.  
2.1 The Republic of Zimbabwe 
The Republic of Zimbabwe succeeded the colonial state of Rhodesia upon its 
independence on 18th April 1980. Geographically it occupies the plateau between the 
rivers Zambezi and Limpopo in southeast Africa. It is bordered by South Africa to the 
south, Botswana to the southwest, Zambia to the northwest and Mozambique to the east. 
Demographically, it is made up of the Shona in their various tribes in the north, south and 
east. The major urban centres in these areas are Harare which is the capital city of 
Zimbabwe, Gweru in the centre of the country, Masvingo in the south, Marondera and 
Mutare in the east, Chinhoyi and Kariba in the west and Bindura in the north. The Shona 
constitute about 70% of the population. The Ndebele that make up about 30 % of the 
population occupy the western part of the country. The major urban centres in the 
western part of the country are Bulawayo which is the country’s second largest city, 
Gwanda, Hwange, Lupane and Victoria Falls. The main indigenous languages are 
ChiShona and isiNdebele. English is the official language. Zimbabwe has a population of 
12 million people and of these 52% are women.5 
Zimbabwe is a unitary state. It is divided into ten administrative provinces6 to which no 
substantial political power is devolved.7 Two of the provinces, Bulawayo and Harare, are 
                                                            
5 The last population census was conducted in 2002.   
6 Provinces are declared by the President in terms of section 3 of the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act. 
7 Chatiza (2009, 1). 
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metropolitan while the remaining eight are a mixture of urban and rural areas. Harare and 
Bulawayo became provinces only in 2005. The urban areas are divided into council areas 
which are in turn divided into wards. The wards are represented in council by a ward 
councillor elected by the local community.8 The rural areas are also divided into council 
areas which are further divided into wards. The wards are each represented in council by 
a councillor elected by the local community.9 Rural local authorities have within them 
hereditary chieftainships but the areas controlled by traditional chiefs do not always 
correspond with ward boundaries. The chieftainships are in turn divided into areas 
governed by headmen and village heads.10 
2.2 Types of local government in Zimbabwe 
2.2.1 Urban local government 
Chakaipa11  traces the history of modern day urban local government to the arrival of the 
first colonial settlers in 1890. This group of white settlers, commonly referred to as the 
Pioneers Column was led by Cecil John Rhodes who owned the British South Africa 
Company. They set up a board of management made up of both elected and appointed 
members of company. The management board was succeeded in 1892 by the Salisbury 
Sanitary Board. In 1894 the Town Management Ordinance gave legal effect to the 
sanitary boards that were sprouting in the emerging towns. The Municipal Ordinance of 
1897 gave municipal status to the towns of Bulawayo and Salisbury with wholly elected 
councillors. 
There was no place for Africans in the local government system that was developing until 
the 1950s when the African Advisory Boards were set up to look after the interest of the 
growing African population in the towns. The management of African townships and 
                                                            
8 Section 4A (1) (a) Urban Councils Act. 
9 Section 11 (a) Rural District Councils Act. 
10 Chatiza (2009, 1). 
11  Chakaipa (2009, 11‐13). 
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‘whites only’ areas were divided along racial lines. At independence in 1980 significant 
changes took place that were aimed at addressing the imbalances of the past.  Attempts 
were made to bring all urban areas together and for the first time Africans could 
participate in local government elections by electing councillors for their own areas. 
Modern day urban councils are categorised according to size and functions. At the lowest 
level are the local boards followed by towns. Municipalities are ranked third and at the 
top are cities. In terms of section 14 of the Urban Councils Act, a growth point, an 
unincorporated urban area, local board or council can apply to the Minister for a change 
in status. There are currently thirty one (31) urban councils in Zimbabwe.12 Table 1 
below shows all the major urban areas in Zimbabwe and their categorisation. 
Table 1 Hierarchy of Urban Councils in Zimbabwe 
                                                            
12 Councillor Induction Handbook, Zimbabwe (2009). 
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Level 1 
Cities 
Harare 
Bulawayo 
Gweru 
Masvingo 
Kadoma 
Kwekwe 
Mutare 
Level 11 
Municipalities 
Redcliff 
Chegutu 
Chitungwiza 
Victoria Falls 
Chinhoyi 
Gwanda 
Marondera 
Bindura 
Level 111 
Town Councils 
Chiredzi 
Norton 
Shurugwi 
Zvishavane 
Gokwe 
Beitbridge 
Rusape 
Karoi 
Chipinge 
Level IV 
Local Boards 
Ruwa 
Chirundu 
Epworth 
Hwange 
Total 
 
 
7 9 10 4 30 
 
Source Chakaipa (2009, 13). 
2.2.2 Rural local government 
Rural local government existed before the coming of the colonial settlers. In its 
rudimentary form, it consisted of the traditional structures of kings, chiefs, headmen and 
kraal heads. Modern day rural local government was introduced in the 1920s when the 
first Native Boards were set up.13 The Native Boards were replaced in 1927 by the Native 
Councils which were made up of elected councillors and traditional leaders. The African 
Councils Act of 1957 consolidated the position of chiefs by elevating them to Vice 
                                                            
13 Chakaipa, (2009, 24). 
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Presidents while the District Commissioner was the President of the African councils in 
the district. With the rise in African nationalism, chiefs became more and more powerful 
as they were used as a counter balance to the threat paused by nationalism. As a result 
many African councils were set up in areas traditionally controlled by chiefs and by the 
time of independence in 1980, there were 241 such councils. These were merged into 55 
district councils through the District Councils Act of 1980. 
There were large–scale commercial farmlands, mines and small urban areas in rural areas 
which were run by the Rural Councils established in 1966. These catered for the interests 
of white large-scale commercial farmers in rural areas. They levied property taxes, rates 
and service charges on their members as well as on business enterprises located at urban 
centres in their areas. Although membership to the council was through regular elections, 
there was no provision for the representation of African labourers who worked on the 
farms. The current Rural District Councils Act was enacted in 1984; bringing together the 
Rural Councils and District Councils. There are sixty (60) rural district councils 
countrywide.14 
2.3 Membership of councils 
In terms of the new section 4A of the UCA, urban councils consist of an elected 
councillor for each ward of the council area and a number of appointed councillors 
representing special interests appointed by the Minister. A councillor is defined as a 
member of council other than a mayor.15 There is no definition of “special interests” in 
the UCA. However, practice has shown that these special interest councillors are 
appointed to represent such groups as women and children, the disabled, business, 
professional interests and minority groups who may not find representation in 
mainstream politics. Appointed councillors may not exceed a quarter of elected 
councillors and shall hold office at the pleasure of the Minister.16 While they are entitled 
                                                            
14 Councillor Induction Handbook, Zimbabwe (2009). 
15 Section 2 (1) Urban Councils Act. 
16 Section 4A (1) (b) Urban Councils Act.  
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to participate in council business and to the same benefits as elected councillors, 
appointed councillors have no vote at council meetings.17 Councillors for rural councils 
are elected or appointed in much the same way.18 The electoral system allows all 
contestants for public office to be elected on party political lines or as independents. 
Starting from the general election of March 2008, Zimbabwe now has a system of 
combined elections at which the President, Members of Parliament and councillors are 
elected into office for a period of five years. 
Section 40 provides the qualifications for election as councillors. A candidate has to be a 
citizen of Zimbabwe, be at least 30 years old and must own a property or be resident in 
the council area for which he is contesting. Councillors lose their seats if convicted and 
sentenced to more than six months imprisonment,19 or if they have been convicted under 
the Prevention of Corruption Act.20 In terms of section 80 of the Urban Councils Act, the 
                                                            
17 Section 4A (2) Urban Councils Act. 
18 See section 11 of the Rural District Councils Act. 
19 Section 41 (7) of the Urban Councils Act. Councillors are also disqualified from nomination as candidates 
or from election as councillors if‐ 
a) they members of another local authority; 
b) they are members of Parliament; 
c) they have been adjudged or declared insolvent or have made an assignment or arrangement or 
composition with creditors; 
d) in the last 5 years have been convicted of taking part in a council matter in which they had an 
interest, have acted for or against council or as agents have appeared before the valuations or 
other boards or licensing authorities; and 
e) he has been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty in connection with funds or other 
property of council; 
 
20 [Chapter 9:16]. 
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Minister may appoint not more than three (3) people as caretakers to act as council in 
certain circumstances.21 
 2.4 The legal status of local government in Zimbabwe 
Local government in Zimbabwe is a creature of statute, enjoying delegated powers. There 
is no constitutional recognition of local government as a distinct sphere of government. It 
is provided for in the UCA, the RDCA and to a lesser extent the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act (PCAA) [Chapter 29:11] as well as the Traditional Leaders Act 
(TLA) [Chapter 29:17]. 
Councils are bodies corporate with perpetual succession. They may sue or be sued in 
their own names.22  The administration of all local government legislation falls under the 
Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD).23 Basically 
there are two types of local authorities i.e. the urban council established under the Urban 
Councils Act and the rural district councils established under the Rural District Councils 
Act. 
2.5 Other local government institutions 
2.5.1 The Provincial Councils     
Provincial councils are established in terms of section 11 of the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act. Their functions include, among other things, the promotion of the 
development of the province,24 the formulation of short and long term policies for the 
province,25 the preparation of annual development and other plans for the province,26 and 
                                                            
21 See Chapter 3. 
22 Section 4 (8) Urban Councils Act and Section 12 Rural District Councils Act. 
23 See section 2 of the Urban Councils Act, Rural District Councils Act, Traditional Leaders Act, Provincial 
Councils and Administration Act. 
24 Section 13 (a) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
25 Section 13 (b) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
26 Section 13 (c) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
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reviewing and evaluating the implementation of development plans and policies within 
the province.27 Provincial councils are classified here as local government institutions 
primarily because they draw the majority of their members from local authorities. 
Section 14 of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act sets out the membership of 
a provincial council, which shall be made up of: 
• the provincial governor as chairperson; 
• mayors and one councillor from each municipal and city council in the 
province; 
• chairperson and one councillor from town councils, local boards and rural 
district councils in the province; 
• a representative from the Provincial Assembly of Chiefs 
The provincial councils are largely irrelevant. They do not have a budget of their own and 
are therefore unable to implement any of the plans they come up with.   
2.5.2 Traditional leaders 
The appointment of chiefs is provided for in section 111 of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. They are appointed by the President in terms of the TLA. They have 
administrative, developmental and judicial duties where they resolve civil disputes in 
terms of African customary law. Chiefs chair ward and village assemblies and are often 
appointed by the Minister to sit in rural district councils as special interest councillors.28 
By and large, the history of traditional leaders has been tainted by their allegiance to and 
support for the government and ruling party. During the colonial era, the colonial 
government attempted to galvanise support for white rule from traditional leaders by 
giving them more powers over land allocation as well as judicial powers to try some 
crimes in their areas. Apart from counteracting nationalist support from the African 
                                                            
27 Section 13 (d) Provincial Councils and Administration Act. 
28 Section 11 (1) (b) Rural District Councils Act. 
 
 
 
 
  13
population, these measures were also meant by the white government to divest itself of 
rural development responsibilities in the African rural areas.29 The chiefs were expected 
by the colonial administration to deal with the large numbers of landless people, itself a 
result of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. These were unpopular decisions and 
chiefs and headmen became the symbol of the hated colonial administration. Surprisingly 
they have continued as symbols of the ruling party in independent Zimbabwe.30 
2.6 Local government financing 
Part XIII of the RDCA provides for the rural council’s sources of income. these are 
levies, rates on rateable property, land development levies, interest on unpaid charges, 
interest on deposits, sales and leases of land, fees and charges for services rendered and 
fines, among others.31 For rural councils, it is difficult to raise revenue as their tax bases 
are very thin and their communities poor. For urban councils the revenue sources include 
property rates, fees and charges for services rendered, leases and sales of land, fines, 
commercial activities among others. In addition, councils may also receive money from 
the government either as block grants or tied grants. Most of this goes towards salaries 
for teachers and nurses employed in council schools and clinics, respectively. If the 
ministers of finance and local government agree, councils may apply for bank overdrafts 
or borrow money from the money market.32 Councils may also receive donations from 
non-governmental organisations mostly for humanitarian assistance. There is no 
entitlement to government grants and the level of government support dwindled to very 
insignificant levels over the years.33 The collection of revenue by local authorities has 
also been affected by councils’ failure to put in place an up-to-date database for all 
                                                            
29 Makumbe  (1998,21) . 
30 Makumbe (2009, 5). 
31 Section 118 Rural District Councils Act. 
32 Section 290 (5) (b) Urban Councils Act. 
33 Local government Policy Review (2005, 19‐23). 
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rateable properties and their failure to retain qualified staff to implement approved 
budgets.  
2.7 Local government powers 
The powers and functions of local government are set out in sections 19834 and 7135 of 
the UCA and the RDCA respectively. In addition, they are authorised to do all such 
things as are calculated to facilitate or are incidental to or conducive to the performance 
of the functions of the council or the exercise of council’s powers in the 2nd Schedule.36 
2.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 gave a general outline of the development of local government in Zimbabwe 
from the period of the coming in of the first white settlers to the present. The first local 
councils were created to serve the white community. At independence measures were put 
in place to ensure that local government was representative as well as democratic by 
allowing all residents as well as property owners to have a say in those that were elected 
into councils. Chapter 3 will look at the substantive and procedural requirements for the 
appointment of a caretaker. 
 
 
 
                                                            
34 The 2nd Schedule to Act lists fifty three (53) powers of urban local authorities which include powers on 
land, open spaces, cultivation and farming, grazing, slaughter houses, conduct of liquor undertakings, 
charges, funerals, libraries and entertainment, among others. In addition, they are authorized to do 
anything calculated to facilitate or are incidental to or conducive to the performance of the functions of 
council or the exercise of these powers. 
35 The powers in the First Schedule include powers on land, conservation of natural resources, water, 
recreational facilities, roads, bridges, dams, parking, sewerage, fire brigade and ambulances, among 
others. 
36 Item 54 to the 2nd Schedule of the Urban Councils Act. 
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  CHAPTER 3 
3.0 Introduction  
Chapter 2 traced the development of local government in Zimbabwe from the time of the 
arrival of the colonial settlers to the present day. It looked at the local government 
institutions that have developed over the years as well as local government powers and 
finances. This chapter looks at the substantive and procedural requirements for the 
appointment of a caretaker in terms of section 80 of the Urban Councils Act. Put 
differently, what circumstances existing in an urban local authority will trigger the 
appointment of a caretaker? How is the caretaker appointed and who qualifies for 
appointment as a caretaker? 
3.1 Supervision of local government 
As seen in paragraph 1.1 above local authorities in Zimbabwe are creatures of statute. As 
creatures of statute, they exercise what is commonly called delegated powers. In 
Zimbabwe the primary local government legislation are the Urban Councils Act (UCA) 
[Chapter 29:15], the Rural District Councils Act (RDCA) [Chapter 29:13], the 
Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) [Chapter 29:17] and the Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act (PCAA) [Chapter 29:11]. Section 2 of each of the above pieces of 
legislation places the administration of the Acts in the Minister of Local Government, 
Rural and Urban Development. It is the Minister who is charged with the monitoring and 
supervision of local government. 
De Visser identifies three broad forms of supervision namely regulation, monitoring or 
evaluation and intervention. Regulation relates to the establishment of the institutional 
framework for the operation of local government as well as its functions.37  Monitoring 
relates to the establishment of mechanisms aimed at continuously looking at the general 
performance of local government to see whether there is compliance with the law.38 It is 
                                                            
37 De Visser (2005, 170). 
38 De Visser (2005, 178). 
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an ongoing exercise done by the central government and will invariably “include the 
functional mechanisms to evaluate local government performance coupled with 
mechanisms for intervening into local governments if the evaluations produce evidence 
of serious problems”.39 It is similar to supervision where national government watches 
over local government in order to ensure appropriate behaviour. In its complex form, 
supervision may involve central government intervening in the affairs of local 
government in order to correct an identified problem. 
 3.2 Local government challenges 
Local authorities in Zimbabwe have for a long time faced many challenges. The 
challenges include the following: 
a) Human resources challenges at all levels due to the skills flight to neighbouring 
countries as a result of the inability by local authorities to pay living wages to 
their workforce. This shortage is manifested at both the manual and technical 
levels. The failure to pay living wages resulted in many council employees 
reporting for work not to provide any service but to use council resources for 
personal gain in order to survive. In the three years before 2009 it was acceptable 
in all local authorities for their employees to have private jobs or to use council 
resources like telephones, offices and vehicles for personal gain. In order to 
address this, it will be necessary to make councils employers of choice by paying 
attractive salaries, reorient council employees on the nature and importance of 
their duties, train councillors on the nature of their duties and how they can run 
councils as profitable businesses.   
b) Local authorities have seen their finances dwindle to unimaginable levels in the 
last decade because of hyperinflation and the general economic decline in the 
country. It was particularly difficult in 2008 when most local authorities could 
not afford to pay their employees, and for those that could still pay they had to be 
innovative and devise remuneration methods like paying salaries in the form of 
                                                            
39 De Visser (2005, 178). 
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food hampers and fuel coupons or to pay employees well before payday, or 
paying salaries twice a month in order to try and beat inflation. Councils also 
began to accept payment for the services they continued to provide in the form of 
fuel coupons or to exchange land with the much needed machinery and vehicles. 
Although the economy has been “dollarised” now, many councils are still 
struggling to meet their expenses, particularly rural councils where the revenue 
base is very thin. For these councils it means they still cannot repair the vehicles 
that are parked in their yards for use in council operations, or to buy machinery 
used in upgrading infrastructure. 
c) The provision of water has now been handed back to local authorities after the 
failed experiment with the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).40 It 
has been argued that the provision of water had been taken away from local 
authorities not because ZINWA could provide a better service, but was meant to 
cripple urban local authorities the bulk of whose finances (about 60%) come 
from water provision. This service was taken away by the government in 2005 
after all urban local authorities fell under the political control of the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
d) Urban local authorities have endured political interference by the central 
government through the Minister who has used his wide powers to suspend and 
dismiss councillors, particularly from the MDC controlled urban areas. The 
Minister has also made it impossible, if not difficult for councils to charge 
economic fees, charges and rates on the basis that the service charges are not 
affordable to many households. The new inclusive government has given hope to 
local authorities for an economic revival. 
                                                            
40 In 2005 Cabinet made a decision to take away the provision of water and sanitary services from urban 
local authorities and gave the responsibility to ZINWA despite the fact that ZINWA did not have the 
capacity to provide the service.  
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e) Even if the economic outlook improves for councils, they will need to work on 
their capacity to charge and collect rates and other levies, something most 
councils have no capacity to do. 
f) Local councils will need to work hard to attract competent councillors and into 
their fold who will be able to run councils as business enterprises as opposed to 
the current situation where most councillors have no clue on their duties and 
responsibilities and staff members are not qualified to do the work they were 
hired to do. 
3.3 The need for supervision 
In the exercise of their delegated authority, local authorities often fail to carry out those 
functions or to exercise those powers which they are required to exercise in terms of the 
law. Their local policies may not be in sync with national policies and often there are 
allegations of corruption or misuse of council funds or property, or local authorities may 
be carrying out activities that do not benefit the local communities in which they operate. 
When this happens it is the responsibility of senior governments to ensure that local 
authorities comply with the law. In this regard, the senior governments may prescribe 
measures designed to bring about compliance but when these measures do not bring the 
desired outcome, senior governments mat step in to perform those functions on behalf of 
the local authorities and where the councillors are an impediment to the turnaround, they 
may be replaced altogether. This exercise of power by senior governments, if provided 
for in terms of the law is perfectly legitimate. 
In prescribing measures for the turnaround of a local authority, or when senior 
governments assume responsibility for the performance of a function and when they 
replace councillors because they are an impediment to the turnaround, they must be alive 
to the need to allow for local solutions or discretions in the exercise of their oversight 
role. 
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3.4 Defining support and intervention 
The concept of support is broad in scope and generally has positive connotations.41 In the 
context of a poorly performing local authority, support processes will be noted where 
external resources or actors are requested or deployed to help the council in its 
improvement journey. From a central government point of view intervention is a form of 
support. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an intervention as “an action or an act of 
coming between or interfering, especially so as to modify or prevent a result.” However 
from the point of view of the local authority, intervention is seen as interference focused 
on avoiding negative outcomes. In general intervention is where a government 
department or ministry takes action that it would not otherwise have taken as a result of a 
critical inspection report or other external evidence of service failure.42  
Central government in Zimbabwe monitors local government in various ways. It may 
take the form of access to records of council, the use of self-reporting mechanisms, 
requests for information, ministerial directives, investigations into suspected wrongs, the 
suspension and dismissal of councillors as well as the appointment of a caretaker to act as 
council, among others.  
The Urban Councils Act sets out the manner of the exercise of powers and functions by 
urban local authorities. The Act also sets out the powers of the Minister regarding the 
operations of urban local authorities. In terms of section 2 of the Act, the administration 
of the Act lies with the Minister of Local Government. One of the powers of the Minister 
is the power to appoint   a caretaker where there are no councillors for the council area or 
the councillors have been suspended, imprisoned or are otherwise unable to exercise 
some or all their functions as councillors. This power must be exercised in a manner that 
shows respect and deference for an elected council and ought to be used only for the 
purpose for which it was created. In this regard it must be noted that the appointment of a 
caretaker is only a temporary measure meant to provide a council pending the holding of 
                                                            
41 Lewis M et al (2007, 10). 
42 Ibid page 10. 
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an election or until there are councillors who are able to exercise all their functions as 
councillors. It must be used only if there are no other ways of correcting the problem. 
Even then, there must be sufficient checks and balances in the system to guard against the 
improper use of the law for other reasons not connected with correcting the problem in 
the local authority. This power will be abused if it is used to settle political scores or if it 
is used to deny people of the area concerned the opportunity to elect their own council. 
3.5 The power to appoint a caretaker 
Section 80 (1) provides as follows: 
“If at any time- 
(a) there are no elected councillors for a council area; or 
(b) all the elected councillors for a council area have been suspended or 
imprisoned or are otherwise unable to exercise all or some of their functions 
as councillors; 
the Minister may appoint not more than three persons to act as caretakers, whether 
or not such persons are qualified through residence or ownership of property to 
become councillors, to act as the council.”43 
3.6 When is a caretaker appointed? 
Caretakers are appointed at any time when there are no elected councillors for a council 
area. This must mean the absence of elected councillors for the particular council area. It 
must refer to a council area that should otherwise have an elected councillor or 
councillors. The word “elect” means to choose someone to hold a position, especially 
public office, by voting.44 It would therefore follow that an elected councillor is a person 
other than a mayor, chosen by voting, to be a member of a council. The absence of 
councillors may come about as a result of a mass resignation by councillors.  
                                                            
43 Section 80 (1) (a) and (b) Urban Councils Act. 
44  Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition. 
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3.7 Suspension, imprisonment or incapacitation of councillors 
A council may have its elected councillors suspended45 or imprisoned.46 In this case the 
need for the appointment of a caretaker to act as council in such instance appears fairly 
straightforward. It is however not so clear when the Minister has to appoint a caretaker on 
account of the elected councillors being “otherwise unable to carry out all or some of 
their functions” in terms of section 80 (1) (b).  
To be “otherwise unable to exercise all or some of their functions” implies a lack of skill, 
means or opportunity to do that which they are required to do,47 or lack of capacity to do 
something. It is difficult to see when such a scenario might arise. An example of such a 
scenario may be where the council is unable to transact on account of lack of quorum. 
3.8 Appointment of a caretaker 
Where the conditions in section 80 (1) (a) or (b) exist, the Minister may appoint not more 
than three persons as caretakers. A “caretaker” is a person holding power temporarily.48 
The verb “act” means temporarily doing the duties of another.49 In the case of a caretaker 
appointed in terms of section 80 to act as council, the appointment can only be for a 
                                                            
45 In terms of section 114, a councillor may be suspended for: 
a) suspected contravention of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) [Chapter 9:16]; 
b) failing to recuse oneself in deliberations in which the councillor has an interest in breach of 
section 107, rendering professional services to or against council in breach of section 108, or 
where a councillor has acted as an agent and appeared before the valuation or other boards or 
licensing authority in breach of section 109; or 
c)  suspected commission of an offence involving dishonesty in connection with any funds or 
property of council. 
46 Section 41 (7) Urban Councils Act. 
47  Collins (2006, 706). 
48  Collins (2006, 115). 
49  Collins (2006, 7). 
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temporary period and for the caretaker to temporarily carry out the duties that an elected 
councillor(s) would otherwise do. 
3.9 Qualifications for appointment as a caretaker 
The persons that may be appointed as caretakers do not have to meet the qualifications 
for election as councillors, like the requirement to own property or to be resident in the 
council area.50 This means that the Minister can literally appoint anyone as he or she sees 
fit. It is submitted that in order that the objectives of the appointment of caretakers are 
met, the persons so appointed must have experience or expertise in local government 
especially as they are being appointed to take care of an existing problem at the local 
authority. For instance, the ministry could send its own officials to take care of the 
situation at council until the next election or until there are councillors who are able to 
exercise all their functions.  Additionally the Ministry could bring in organised local 
government, in this case the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ) to help 
normalise the situation in the local authority. Lastly because councillors are elected by 
the communities in which they serve, their dismissal and replacement by a caretaker must 
only be done as a last resort and only in deserving cases, all the time striking a balance 
between the competing interests in a municipal council.  
3.10 Conclusion  
Thi s chapter looked at the substantive and procedural requirements for the appointment 
of a caretaker in terms of section 80. A caretaker may be appointed where there are no 
elected councillors for a council area or where all the elected councillors for a council 
area have been suspended or imprisoned or are otherwise unable to exercise all or some 
of their functions as councillors. The caretaker does not have to meet the requirements for 
election as a councillor. It was noted that the Minister is not accountable to anyone in the 
suspension or dismissal of councillors and in their replacement by a caretaker. It was 
proposed that the Minister could be required to motivate to Parliament the need to 
suspend or dismiss councillors and replace them with a caretaker in order to provide 
                                                            
50 Proviso to section 80 (1) (a) and (b) Urban Councils Act. 
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some checks and balance in the system. Chapter 4 will look at the functions of a 
caretaker.   
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 CHAPTER 4 
4.0 Introduction 
Chapter 3 looked at the substantive and procedural requirements for the appointment of a 
caretaker. It was noted that the appointment of a caretaker is discretionary and that it may 
be done if there are no councillors or if the elected councillors have been suspended, 
imprisoned or are otherwise unable to exercise all their functions as councillors. It was 
also noted that in appointing a caretaker, the Minister is not accountable to anyone. It was 
therefore proposed that some accountability in the process could be introduced by 
requiring the Minister to justify the appointment to Parliament and that Parliament be 
empowered to block the appointment if it is not satisfied with the reasons given or the 
proposed terms of reference for the caretaker. This chapter will look at the functions of a 
caretaker. 
4.1 The Functions of a caretaker 
Chapter 3 looked at the appointment of a caretaker to act as council. This chapter will 
examine the functions of the caretakers after they have been appointed. Section 80 (2) 
provides that- 
 “Subject to any directions the Minister may give him, a caretaker appointed for a council 
area in terms of subsection (1) shall exercise—  
(a) all the functions of the council, where there are no elected councillors for the   council 
area; or  
(b) such of the functions of the councillors as they are unable to exercise, where there are 
elected councillors for the council area:  
In the scenario provided for in section 80 (2) (a) a caretaker is appointed to exercise all 
the functions of council. In this scenario there are no elected councillors. Under the 
scenario provided for in section 80 (2) (b) where there are elected councillors, the 
caretaker is appointed to exercise only those functions of the councillors that they are 
unable to exercise. It appears therefore that the caretaker is appointed to take over from 
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some functions of councillors leaving out those functions that the elected councillors are 
able to exercise. In this regard the caretaker does not take over the exercise of all of the 
functions of the entire council. 
4.2 Limitations on the functions of a caretaker 
Section 80 places a limit on what the appointed caretaker can do. If the council area has 
no elected councillors, the caretaker has no authority  to levy rates or taxes or to alienate 
land or interest in land or to increase any charge fixed or levied by the council or to fix 
any new charge without the approval of the Minister.51 The need for the approval of the 
Minister to levy rates or taxes or to dispose of land simply reinforces the fact that the 
caretaker will be under the direction of the Minister.52 This may appear contrary to the 
reason of the caretaker’s appointment, which is to act as council in certain circumstances. 
Perhaps it is recognition of the fact that these are important which can only be done by an 
elected council. It is submitted that this limitation is superfluous as the caretaker 
exercises his functions under the direction of the Minister as provided for in section 80 
(2).  
In a council area where there are elected councillors who are able to exercise some of 
their functions as councillors, the caretaker is obliged to consult them before exercising 
any function.53 It is noted here that while the law provides for the consultation of elected 
councillors by the caretaker; there is no requirement that the caretaker shall be bound by 
the elected councillors’ views. It is possible that the caretaker may effectively sideline the 
remaining elected councillors in the transaction of council business. Further there is no 
provision to resolve any disputes over the control of council between the remaining 
elected councillors and the caretaker. It is submitted that the Act must stipulate clearly, a 
clear division of the roles that the remaining councillors and the caretaker will play in 
council. If section 80 (2) (b) is understood to mean that the caretaker will only exercise 
                                                            
51 Section 80 (2) (b) (i) Urban Councils Act. 
52 Section 80 (2) Urban Councils Act. 
53 Section 80 (2) (ii) Urban Councils Act. 
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those functions that elected councillors are unable to exercise where there are elected 
councillors, it would mean that the elected councillors would still have a role to play in 
the affairs of council. In practice however, as will be seen in Chapter 4, the remaining 
councillors have little or no say in what transpires at council once the caretaker has taken 
over. 
4.3 The tenure of office of the caretaker 
The caretaker shall hold office at the Minister’s pleasure. In other words the caretaker 
shall hold the office at the wish and desire of the Minister. However the caretakership 
shall terminate- 
as soon as there are “any councillors who are able to exercise all their functions as 
councillors”.54 The use of the word “any” indicates that these are councillors separate 
from those that had remained and combined with those that had remained, are enough to 
constitute a quorum to transact council business. For example, the Minister may suspend 
a certain number of councillors pending an investigation in terms of section 114 of the 
Urban Councils Act. The suspension may result in the remaining councillors not 
constituting a quorum as a result of which a caretaker is appointed. If at the end of the 
investigation all the suspended councillors or some of them are cleared and the 
suspension is lifted these councillors will be able to exercise all their functions. As soon 
as this happens, the office of the caretaker will terminate within ninety days after the date 
of his or her appointment.55 If the period of ninety days expires within three months 
before the date of the next succeeding general election, the caretaker shall continue to 
hold office until such general election. In the context of time frames, “within” means 
before the period has passed. It would therefore mean that if the period of ninety days 
comes to an end within three months of a general election, the caretaker shall continue to 
hold office until the general election. However, in the past this provision was used to 
reappoint commissioners for longer than is permissible. 
                                                            
54 Section 80 (3) (a) Urban Councils Act. 
55 Section 80 (3) (b) Urban Councils Act . 
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4.4 Conclusion  
It is clear from section 80 that a caretaker may be appointed to act as council. At first 
glance it appears that the caretaker will have all the powers that a council would have. 
However the caretaker will carry out all the functions of the council only where there are 
no elected councillors or such functions of the elected councillors as they are unable to 
exercise, where there are elected councillors. In the first scenario, the caretaker will not 
exercise any power conferred on the council to levy rates or taxes or to alienate any land 
or interest in land or to increase any charge fixed or levied by council or to levy any new 
charge, without the approval of the Minister. In the latter, the caretaker shall exercise the 
functions in consultation with the elected councillors. Either way, the caretaker will be 
under the direction of the Minister. The scenario in which there are elected councillors 
may be a source of friction between the caretaker and the elected councillors as there is 
no clear demarcation of the roles that each one of them is confined to during the period of 
the caretakership. The case would be different if the caretaker took over the exercise of 
the functions of the whole council as opposed to the exercise of the functions of some of 
the councillors. By requiring the caretaker to consult the remaining councillors, the 
legislature showed deference to the local community that elected the councillors into 
office. It is submitted that in order for the council to run smoothly, the caretaker should 
not be bound by the views of the remaining councillors. The next chapter will look at the 
appointment of commissioners for the City of Harare under the old section 80 of the Act. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapter 4 looked at the functions of a caretaker. It was observed that the caretaker is 
under the direction of the Minister and that the caretaker will serve at the pleasure of the 
Minister. Further, the caretaker will not be able to exercise some of council’s functions to 
raise revenue or to alienate land without the approval of the Minister, where there are no 
councillors. However, where there are elected councillors, this power will be exercised in 
consultation with the other councillors. There is no clear demarcation of roles between 
the caretaker and any remaining councillors. It was proposed that in order for council to 
run smoothly, the caretaker should not be bound by the views of the remaining 
councillors. This chapter will carry a case study of the City of Harare where a 
commission was appointed in terms of the old section 80 which is similar in many 
respects to the new section.  
5.1 Case Study: The Appointment of Commissioners for the City of Harare 
The City of Harare was the only local authority where the old section 80 was used. It was 
run by commissioners during the period March 1999 to March 2002 and December 2004 
to March 2008. It is important to look at how the old section 80 was applied to a local 
authority that was adjudged to have problems. This case study will show whether the 
amended section 80 addressed the shortcomings in the old law. It may also be useful in 
showing the shortfalls in the current law and thus the need for further reforms. It will be 
seen from the narration below that the section was used for political ends. 
5.2 The old section 80 of the Urban Councils Act 
 The old section 80 of UCA provided as follows- 
80 (1) “If at any time—  
(a) there are no councillors for a council area; or  
(b) all the councillors for a council area have been suspended or imprisoned or are 
otherwise unable to exercise all or some of their functions as councillors;  
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the Minister may appoint one or more persons as commissioners, whether or not such 
persons are qualified through residence or ownership of property to become councillors, 
to act as the council...”  
Commissioners who were appointed in a council area where there were no councillors 
were entitled to exercise all the functions of council.56 However, if there were councillors 
in the council area, the commissioners would only exercise such of the functions of 
council that the councillors were unable to exercise.57 In addition the commissioners 
could not exercise any power conferred on council to raise funds of to dispose of land or 
rights in land, without the approval of the Minister.58 The commissioners were also 
obliged to consult with those councillors that were still able to exercise some of their 
functions as councillors before exercising any function.59 The notable differences 
between the old and new section 80 are the following: 
a) the new section limits the number of caretakers to three60  whereas in terms of the 
old section there was  provision for one or more commissioners;61 
b) in the new section, the caretaker now holds office until there are councillors who 
are able to exercise all their functions62 or the office terminates within ninety 
days. If the ninety days expire within three months of a general election, the  
caretaker shall hold office until the general election.63 In the old section, the 
commissioners held office for six months and if the six months expired within 
                                                            
56 Section 80 (2( (a) Urban Councils Act.  
57 Section 80 (2) (b) Urban Councils Act. 
58 Section 80 (2) (b) (i) Urban Councils Act. 
59 Section 80 (2) (b) (ii) Urban Councils Act. 
60 See the new section 80 (1) Urban Councils Act.  
61 Section 80 (1) before the amendment. 
62 Section 80 (3) (a) Urban Councils Act. 
63 Section 80 (3) (b) Urban Councils Act. 
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three months of a general election, the period was extended to the general 
election;64 
c) the commissioners were charged with causing the holding of an election at the 
end of their term of office whereas in terms of the new section, the responsibility 
to cause an election lies with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission;65 
d) the old section 80 (5), which allowed the Minister to reappoint the caretaker was 
left out in the new section 80.  
e) the term of office of commissioners could be extended for another term if at its 
end, the Minister was satisfied that there would be no councillors for the council 
area who would be able to exercise all their functions.66 
Although the formulation of the two sections is similar, it is submitted that the new 
section is not much different from the old section. It is not clearly stated that the 
appointment of a caretaker may only be done as a last resort, and only if other corrective 
measures have not yielded the desired result. In addition, the new section does not 
introduce any checks and balances in the exercise by the Minister, of his power to appoint 
a caretaker 
5.3 The City of Harare 
The City of Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 
1.600.000 with 2.800.000 in its metropolitan area. Together with the city of Bulawayo, 
the two cities form the only metropolitan provinces in Zimbabwe. The cities were 
changed into metropolitan provinces  in 2003. 
                                                            
64 Proviso to the old section 80 (3) (b) Urban Councils Act. 
65 Section 80 (4) Urban Councils Act. 
66 The old section 80 (5) Urban Councils Act.  
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5.4 The Chanakira Commission March 1999 - March 2002 
Before the Chanakira Commission was appointed to run the affairs of Harare City 
Council in March 1999, the city had a council that had been elected into office in August 
1995. The term of this council would have come to an end in August 1999.67 The 
councillors were suspended by the Minister on allegations of incompetence in February 
1999 and a commission to run the affairs of the city was appointed in March 1999 (the 
Chanakira Commission). In June of the same year the mayor resigned from his post. In 
terms of the then section 103J of the Electoral Act, an election for the post of mayor was 
to be held within sixty days of the post becoming vacant. In terms of section 103K of the 
Urban Councils Act, the Minister could postpone the election of councillors for one year. 
If the term of office of the commissioners had terminated within six months as provided 
for in the law, it would have coincided with the holding of elections for councillors in 
August 1999. It would also have coincided with the holding of an election for the mayor. 
However there were no elections for the mayor or for councillors until March 2002. 
Acting in terms of section 80 (5) the Minister simply reappointed the commissioners 
when their term expired. While the Minister was empowered to reappoint the 
commissioners, the effect was that this prevented elections from being held for the city of 
Harare. 
5.5 Challenges to the reappointment of commissioners 
The first legal challenge to the continued reappointment of the commissioners was made 
by the Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA).68 CHRA successfully obtained 
an order to compel the Registrar General of Elections to hold mayoral and council 
elections for the City of Harare by a certain date. The Court held that the appointment of 
commissioners was a stop-gap measure  and could not be used to deny the inhabitants of 
                                                            
67 Before its amendment, section 43 (2) of the UCA as read with section 103 l of the Electoral Act [Chapter 
2: 13], council elections were held in every 4th year on any day in the month of August. 
68 Combined Harare Residents Association and Another v The Registrar General of Elections and Others HH 
210/2001. 
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the City of Harare the right to elect a body of their choice to govern their affairs in 
Harare. This point was also made in Stevenson v The Minister of Local Government and 
National Housing and Others,69 where it was held that the reappointment of 
commissioners was unlawful.70  The Chanakira Commission ended with the council 
elections held in March 2002. 
5.6 The Makwavarara Commission December 2004 - March 2008 
The 2002 mayoral and council elections saw the opposition MDC take control of most 
urban local authorities.71 The city of Harare was, together with the city of Bulawayo, 
turned into metropolitan provinces in 2003. Two provincial governors were appointed to 
run the provinces. However, because the provinces covered the same geographical area as 
the two cities, this created tension between the mayors and the governors. The tension 
was made worse by the fact that the mayors and governors belonged to different political 
parties. In addition, the mayors felt that the appointment was meant to dilute the influence 
of their party in the areas they controlled. The mayor of Harare was suspended by the 
Minister in April 2003 on allegations of “mismanagement of the city affairs leading to a 
decline in service delivery to the residents and ratepayers of Harare.”72 In August 2004 
all the MDC councillors had either been suspended or had resigned in protest over what 
they said was undue interference by the Minister in the running of council affairs. A 
commission to run the affairs of the city was appointed by the Minister in December 
2004 (the Makwavarara Commission). Although the term of office of this commission 
was supposed to end in June 2005, it was reappointed over and over again until the 
                                                            
69 SC 38/2002. 
70 At page 9. 
71 In the City of Harare the MDC won 45 of the 46 council seats.   Available at 
http://www.kubatana.net./html/archive/locgov/041024zimstand..asp?secto=LOCGOV&year=2004&range
_start=1 (accessed 8th June 2009). 
72 These accusations appeared in the letter of suspension from the Minister, dated 29th April 2003. 
Available at 
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/locgov/030429chombo.asp?sector=LOCGOV&year=2003&range 
_start=1 (Accessed on 8th June 2009). 
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general election in March 2008 when new councillors and a new mayor were elected. 
Although there were no direct legal challenges to the reappointment of this commission, 
some decisions from the High Court confirmed that the commission was in fact illegal.73 
The court reiterated its earlier finding that the appointment of commissioners was a stop-
gap measure pending the holding of elections for the city. It went further to hold that the 
decisions that had been made by the commissions were illegal because they had been 
made by illegal bodies.  
It must be pointed out that while the Minister gave the lack of service delivery as the 
reason for the appointment of commissioners or for his other interferences; there was no 
improvement in the way the City of Harare was run. During the tenure of the 
commissions some suburbs had no running water for months on end. There was no refuse 
collection and burst water and sewer pipes were not being attended to. 
5.7 Conclusion  
The appointment of commissioners in terms of the old section of the Urban Councils Act 
was a stop-gap measure meant to bring normalcy to council operations following the 
dismissal or suspension of councillors. It was not meant to deny the inhabitants of the 
council area the opportunity to elect councillors of their own choice. The reappointment 
of the commissioners after their terms had come to an end was unlawful and calculated to 
postpone indefinitely, council elections for the City of Harare. The new section 80 has no 
provision for the reappointment of caretakers once their term has come to an end. The 
next chapter carries a comparative analysis of section 80 of the Urban Councils Act and 
section 139 (1) (c) of the South African Constitution which provides for the dissolution of 
a council in certain circumstances. 
 
 
                                                            
73 Nomutsa Mushoma Chideya v Sekesai Makwavarara and Others HH 13/2007 and Christopher M. 
Zvobgo v City of Harare and Another HH 80/2005. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
6.0 Introduction 
Chapter 5 carried a case study of the City of Harare where commissioners were appointed 
for successive terms without following the law. It was noted that the appointments were 
made for political reasons which had nothing to do with the reasons given by the 
Minister. The new section 80 does not provide for the reappointment of the caretaker and 
places the duty to hold an election for the council in the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission, which are improvements on the old section.  This chapter will carry a 
comparative analysis of section 80 and section 139 (1) (c) of the South African 
Constitution.  
6.1 The dissolution of a council in terms of section 139 (1) (c) of the South African 
Constitution 
The appointment of a caretaker to act as council pending an election can be likened to the 
dissolution of a municipal council in terms of section 139 (1) (c) of the Constitution of 
South Africa.74 The comparison is relevant in several respects. Both systems take away 
from the elected council, the power to make decisions in respect of council affairs and 
pending an election, a caretaker or administrator is appointed to act as council. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe share a colonial past. The two countries legal history has a strong 
Roman-Dutch law influence as well as the English law influence. Both countries, but 
more particularly South Africa, have passed legislation to provide for a particular system 
of local government. The South African system will be briefly discussed here and some 
comparisons made with section 80 of the Urban Councils Act. 
6.2 Constitutional framework for local government 
In terms of section 40 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa, government is made up as 
national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated. All spheres of government must respect the 
                                                            
74 Act 108 of 1996. 
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constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other 
spheres.75 They must exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that 
does not encroach on the geographical, functional and institutional integrity of 
government in the other spheres.76 Each sphere has a budget,77 and the division and 
allocation of revenue between the three spheres is done in accordance with national 
legislation.78  
In the new Constitution, local government assumed an enhanced status. While 
historically it was a creature of statute owing its existence to provincial ordinances,79 the 
new local government derives its existence from the Constitution. The new status of local 
government was aptly captured in the words of former Deputy Minister V. Moosa MP 
when he described it as follows: 
 “Local government in this country, as in many other countries, has always been treated 
as a stepchild of the first and second tiers of government. We have attempted, and I think 
we have by and large succeeded, in removing this second-class status of local 
government. Local government is now recognised, side-by-side with the national and        
provincial level, as a tier of government in its own right with the full constitutional 
protection that provincial governments themselves enjoy.”80 
                                                            
75 Section 41 (1) (e) Constitution. 
76 Section 41 (1) (g) Constitution.  
77 Section 215 (1) Constitution. 
78 Section 214 (1) Constitution. 
79 Steytler and de Visser (2007,1‐3). 
80 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly 1996:239. In this regard see also the words of the Constitutional 
Court in re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 
para. 364. 
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Being a distinctive sphere is ‘…suggestive of an equality as between the concepts of 
national, provincial and local governmental structures, as opposed to the more traditional 
levels of power and importance’.81  
The new local government enjoys a relatively high degree of autonomy. It is made up of 
municipalities which were set up for the whole of South Africa.82 The municipal council 
is vested with both the executive and legislative authority.83 The municipality has the 
power to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of is community, 
subject to national and provincial legislation.84 In terms of section 151 (4) both the 
national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s 
ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions. 
The relationship between the different spheres is predicated on cooperative government 
and each sphere is obliged to observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative 
government in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.85 Every provincial government has a duty to 
support local government and to promote its developmental capacity so as to enable local 
government to perform their functions and duties.86  Section 154 (1) requires national and 
provincial government to support and strengthen the capacities of municipalities to 
manage their own affairs and to exercise and perform their functions. The autonomy of 
local government is limited by national and provincial legislation87 and the provincial 
government must, by legislative and other measures, provide for the monitoring and 
                                                            
81 Uthukela District Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2002 (5) 
BCLR 479 at 485 G‐H. 
82 Section 151 (1) Constitution. 
83 Section 151 (2) Constitution. 
84 Section 151 (3) Constitution. 
85 Section 40 (2) Constitution. 
86 Section 155 (6) Constitution. 
87 Section 151 (30 Constitution. 
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support of local government in the province.88 In terms of section 155 (7), the national 
and provincial governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of their functions. 
To sum up, local government is a “…sphere of government that is profoundly 
democratic, enjoys a measure of self-government, is mandated to be developmental and 
functions in cooperation with and under the supervision of the provincial and national 
spheres of government”.89  
6.3 Section 139 (1) (c) of the South African Constitution 
The dissolution of the municipal council is provided for in section 139 (1) (c) and (3) of 
the Constitution. Section 139 (1) (c) provides that:- 
1) When a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of 
the Constitution or legislation, the relevant provincial executive may intervene by 
taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfillment of that obligation, including- 
a)… 
b)… 
c) dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator until a newly 
elected Municipal Council is declared elected, is exceptional circumstances 
warrant such a step. 
In order for the provincial executive to intervene there must be a statutory precondition or 
jurisdictional fact,90 i.e. that it cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation. The 
words “… cannot or does not…” are in the present tense and mean an ongoing failure as 
opposed to a past failure to fulfil an executive obligation.91  The provincial executive has 
                                                            
88 Section 155 (6) (a) Constitution. 
89 Steytler and de Visser at (2007,1‐23). 
90 Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier, Eastern Cape and Others para 49. 
91 Supra para 51. 
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the discretion to intervene but when the executive decides to intervene, he or she may do 
so by taking “any appropriate steps.” In deciding on what constitutes appropriate steps 
the court ruled that they are steps that are suitable or proper, taking into account the 
conflicting interests of all those involved and affected i.e. the nature of the obligation that 
has not been fulfilled, the interests of those affected by the failure to fulfil the executive 
obligation and the interests of the municipality. It is a balance of the constitutional 
imperative to respect the integrity of local government against the constitutional 
requirement of good government.92 
In explaining what would constitute exceptional circumstances, Steytler and de Visser 
argue that the general principle should be that dissolution is an instrument for dealing 
with the situation where the municipal council’s conduct is the cause of the continued 
failure to comply with an executive obligation.93 They argue further that dissolution is the 
last of a series of steps that a provincial executive can take in correcting a municipality 
that has failed to govern.94 It is a recognition of the fact that dissolution is the more 
drastic and far-reaching of the three forms of intervention authorised in sub-section (1) 
which must not only be an appropriate step but must be resorted to in exceptional 
circumstances only.95 
6.4 Comparison 
The two types of interventions arise in a fundamentally different context. In the 
Zimbabwean local government system, local government is a creature of statute and 
exercises delegated powers. Local government in Zimbabwe is not an autonomous sphere 
as is the case in South Africa. It is therefore expected and fitting for Zimbabwe to have a 
more intrusive system of supervision. However, it is important that there be respect for 
the law and where intervention becomes necessary, the law must allow for some measure 
                                                            
92 Supra para 72. 
93 Page 15‐26. 
94 Page 15‐27.  
95 Supra para 79. 
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of discretion and respect for the institutional integrity of local government. The following 
differences can be identified in the two systems: 
a) In terms of section 139 (1) (c) a council may be dissolved and an administrator 
appointed until a newly elected municipal council is declared elected, if 
exceptional circumstances warrant such a step. As shown above, section 139 (1) 
(c) envisages an incremental series of steps with dissolution as the last step to be 
taken in correcting a municipality that will have failed to govern. Dissolution is 
justified by the manifest failure of the previous intervention.96 However the court 
in the Mnquma judgement seems to have taken a different view in its 
interpretation of the word “or” in section 139 (1). 
b) Before dissolving the municipal council, the provincial executive may notify the 
municipal council in writing of the intention to dissolve the council. In the South 
African intergovernmental relations system, it seems proper that the municipality 
be notified of the impending dissolution. 
c) In Zimbabwe, a caretaker may be appointed if there are no elected councillors for 
a council area, or if the councillors have been suspended or imprisoned or are 
otherwise unable to exercise all or some of their functions as councillors.97 The 
main difference here is that while in South Africa a council may be dissolved if it 
cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation, the Zimbabwean scenario looks 
more at the conduct of the councillors. 
d) The most significant difference is in the system of intergovernmental checks and 
balances that is in place in the South African system.  Section 139 (3) (b) provides 
that the dissolution takes effect unless the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
or the Minister sets it aside within 14 days from the date of receipt of the notice 
by the NCOP. During this 14 day period the Minister or the NCOP may set aside 
the dissolution and the decision to set it aside is done independently of the other. 
                                                            
96 Section 34 (3) (b) Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
97 Section 80 (1) (a) and (b) Urban Councils Act. 
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In addition, a notice must also be sent to the provincial legislature98 to which the 
MEC is accountable. Steytler and de Visser identify two purposes for the notice to 
the provincial legislature.99 Firstly, it is intended to inform the provincial 
legislature of the intended dissolution so that it exercises its function of 
overseeing the exercise of provincial executive authority. Secondly, the notice is 
intended to facilitate the provincial legislature’s decision on a mandate for its 
delegates in the NCOP with regard to the approval of the dissolution. In 
Zimbabwe, while the Minister may be called upon to answer questions in 
Parliament, this has no bearing on the Minister as he is appointed by the President 
and serves during the pleasure of the President.100 
e) Section 139 (1) (c) has both legal and political safeguards. First is the objective 
determination of whether there has been a failure to fulfil an executive obligation. 
Second is the need to intervene in a manner that is appropriate. Thirdly, there 
must be exceptional circumstances to warrant a dissolution and lastly on a 
political level, the Cabinet member for local government or the National Council 
of Provinces are empowered to terminate any form of action taken against a 
municipality under sub-section (1) (c). 
f) Lastly, in the South African scenario, a province will take over from an entire 
council whereas in Zimbabwe the incapacity of some councillors may result in a 
takeover. However the remaining councillors must be consulted before the 
caretaker exercises any function. 
6.5 Conclusion  
This Chapter compared the South African and the Zimbabwean legal regimes on the 
appointment of administrators or caretakers to act as council following the dissolution of 
                                                            
98 Section 139 (3) (ii) Constitution. 
99 Page 15‐23. 
100 Section 31G (2) Zimbabwe Constitution. 
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council or the suspension of councillors. It has been noted that the South African system 
allows for a system of intergovernmental checks and balances. Further the provincial 
executive is accountable to the provincial legislature which exercises an oversight over 
the exercise of provincial executive authority. There are no such intergovernmental 
checks and balances in Zimbabwe. The next chapter will carry the conclusion of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 7  
Conclusion  
The Minister of Local Government can appoint a caretaker if there are no elected 
councillors for a council area or if all the elected councillors for a council area have been 
suspended or imprisoned or are unable to exercise all or any of their functions as 
councillors. This power to appoint a caretaker represents one of the most intrusive forms 
of intervention into local government affairs by the Minister. This power must be used 
sparingly and only in deserving circumstances.   As creatures of statute, local authorities 
can only exercise those powers assigned to them in terms of the law. In terms of the 
current legislation they are treated more as an extension of central government and 
therefore operate at the pleasure of the Minister. This is legitimized by the inferior status 
of local government in Zimbabwe which allows for intrusive intervention mechanisms. 
While the country is decentralized, no real power has been transferred to local authorities. 
It is therefore important that the law is obeyed by all and that the system for the 
appointment of a caretaker is not used for political ends. 
 While the amendment to section 80 took away some of the powers of the Minister, it is 
argued that the amendment did not go far enough. Granted, it will be necessary for the 
Minister to suspend councillors or to dissolve councils in appropriate circumstances. 
However the system must allow for openness, transparency and objectivity in dealing 
with wayward councils. This can be achieved only if there are adequate checks and 
balances to guard against arbitrary behaviour that may be motivated more by political 
considerations than the need to improve the performance of councils. It is proposed that 
the appointment of a caretaker could be improved by requiring the Minister to motivate 
the need for the suspension or councillors and therefore the need for the appointment of a 
caretaker to Parliament. Further he could be required to outline in his motivation, the 
proposed measures to get the council back on track, with Parliament empowered to block 
the suspension or appointment if it is not satisfied that these are justified. At the end of 
the caretakership, the Minister must table a report before Parliament on the suspension 
and the work of the caretaker. 
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The constitutional review process that is under way provides an opportunity for some of 
the proposed changes to local government legislation. one of the important changes 
would be the recognition of local government as a separate form of government, distinct 
from central government. Further, while central government will retain its supervisory 
powers over local government, the manner of supervision will be governed by the 
constitution. The constitutional recognition of local government and the delineation of 
circumstances when central government may intervene will provide protection to local 
government as constitutional changes will need a certain amount of support before they 
can be passed. 
A comparison was made with the dissolution of a municipal council in terms of section 
139 (1) (c) of the South African Constitution. It was noted that the South African system 
provides safeguards to local government by limiting the intervention to the non- 
fulfilment of executive obligations and by requiring the provincial executive to take 
“appropriate steps including dissolution if exceptional circumstances warrant such a 
step”. In addition the Cabinet Minister or the National Council of Provinces can veto the 
dissolution if they are not satisfied with the reasons given by the provincial executive. 
Parliament in Zimbabwe could be empowered to play the role that the Cabinet Minister 
or the National Council of Provinces plays in the South African system. 
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